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ON KEEPING THINGS IN PROPORTION
Adam Lovett and Stefan Riedener
oanna is the victim of a natural disaster. A drought has caused the har-
vest to fail. She does not have enough food. You donate one hundred dollars 
to the Red Cross and that gets her the food she desperately needs. This is a 
good thing, and for a while it seems you have done something very important. 
You have saved a life! But then you get some perspective. You realize that Joanna 
is not the only victim of this natural disaster. The drought has struck her entire 
community, even her entire nation. Millions of people are at risk of starvation. 
You have saved a tiny proportion of them. Now the significance of your action 
seems diminished. It seems to matter somewhat less. We will call this the Drop 
in the Ocean Intuition. The intuition is that the fact that your action makes a tiny 
dent in the overall extent of suffering diminishes its importance. Your contribu-
tion matters less when it is a drop in the ocean.
Some philosophers think this intuition is hopeless. Jonathan Glover calls it 
a “context illusion.” He claims that “it can be dismissed at once.”1 Peter Unger 
calls it “futility thinking.” He says that “when [gripped by this intuition] you’re 
greatly influenced by a consideration which is morally irrelevant.”2 Peter Singer 
holds that the intuition “doesn’t stand up to examination.”3 William MacAskill 
says it “doesn’t make any sense.”4 But we are more sanguine. We want to explore 
a view that validates some form of this intuition. We think that only when we 
have such a view on the table can we assess its plausibility.
The view we want to explore is simple. It says that a thing’s importance de-
pends on how big a proportional contribution it makes to the world’s total value. 
For example, consider the addition of one happy life. According to this view, 
the importance of this addition depends on what is going on elsewhere in the 
1 Glover and Scott-Taggart, “It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It,” 172.
2 Unger, Living High and Letting Die, 63.
3 Singer, The Life You Can Save, 59. In the passage this comes from Singer is referring to the 
intuition that we should favor saving people we see over people we do not see. But he then 
says “the same is true” for the Drop in the Ocean Intuition.
4 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, 30.
J
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universe. If the universe contains just one happy life, then the addition involves 
a great proportional improvement. So it is very important. But if instead the uni-
verse contains a hundred billion happy lives, then the addition is a tiny propor-
tional improvement. So it is not very important. The number of happy lives in 
the universe affects the importance of the addition of one more happy life. We 
will call this view Proportionalism.5
Proportionalism implies that the relative insignificance of saving Joanna does 
indeed diminish its importance. But it does not validate everything involved 
with the Drop in the Ocean Intuition. Some people, for instance, think that if 
saving Joanna is just a drop in the ocean, then we may as well indulge ourselves 
instead. Go buy yourself priority boarding! But this need not follow. Your reason 
to save Joanna may be diminished by its proportional insignificance. But so is 
your reason to indulge yourself. And they are diminished in proportion to their 
original weight. So, the relative dominance of the former is untouched. Other 
people misapply proportional thinking. They take the importance of something 
to be the proportional contribution it makes to a specific issue. For instance, 
suppose two populations are suffering famine. Some people prefer saving 75 per-
cent of the smaller population to saving 25 percent of the much larger one, even 
if this saves fewer lives overall.6 According to Proportionalism, these people are 
making a mistake. It is not the size of the specific problem that matters. It is the 
size of the whole world. These people are using the wrong reference class. Pro-
portionalism, then, is not meant to validate everything involved with the Drop 
in the Ocean Intuition. It is only meant to validate its core.
In the rest of the paper we explore this view. In section 2, we formulate Pro-
portionalism precisely. In sections 3–5, we look at its further motivation. In sec-
tion 6, we see how to extend it. In these later sections we also show how versatile 
Proportionalism is. We will see an agent-relative version of the view (section 
5.1). We will see versions of it restricted to certain kinds of facts (section 5.4) 
5 Nick Bostrom talks about this view in his “Infinite Ethics.” He says: “We might constitute a 
minute portion of the whole, but that does not detract from our absolute importance” (“In-
finite Ethics,” 10). In other words, he dismisses Proportionalism out of hand. We have come 
across no other prior discussion of Proportionalism.
6 Psychologists call this phenomenon “proportion dominance” (Bartels, “Proportion Dom-
inance”), “psychological numbing” (Fetherstonhaugh et al., “Insensitivity to the Value of 
Human Life”), or the “reference group effect” (Loewenstein and Jenni, “Explaining the 
‘Identifiable Victim Effect’”). They have studied the phenomenon extensively. In one study, 
Daniel Bartels asked subjects to choose between either a program that saved 225 lives of 230 
at risk, or one that saved 230 lives of 920 at risk (“Proportion Dominance”). Almost half 
chose the former. They took the greater proportion of the at-risk population saved to be of 
greater moral weight than the extra lives. We think it is a strength of Proportionalism that it 
can help explain why people make this mistake.
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and types of normativity (section 5.6). And we will see how it fits into a much 
broader phenomenon: proportional thinking (section 6.1). But let us not get 
ahead of ourselves. We will first locate the notion of importance that matters to 
Proportionalism.
1. Characterizing Importance
The Drop in the Ocean Intuition involves importance or significance. So we need 
to give an account of how important or significant something is. Our notion of 
importance is not the axiological notion. For something to be important, in our 
sense, is not for it to be worth promoting. Our notion is instead understood in 
terms of fitting attitudes. How important something is is how much it is fitting 
to care about it. What is it for an attitude to be fitting? For us, it is just for it to be 
permissible to have that attitude. So, we characterize our notion of importance 
with the following principle:
Caring: How important something is just is the most one is permitted to 
care about it.
The relevant type of permissibility is that which rules attitudes of caring. This is 
not the same as moral, prudential, or epistemic permissibility. It is a distinctive 
normativity that governs how much we care about things. We think there is such 
a type of normativity because, intuitively, one’s attitudes of caring can be mistak-
en in distinctive ways. We all know people who care more than anything about 
long-gone sporting victories. Their attitudes are out of whack; they are making 
a mistake. But this need not be a moral or prudential mistake. Still less must it 
be an epistemic mistake. Rather, it is a mistake parochial to attitudes of caring. 
So, there seems to be a distinctive normativity that governs such attitudes.7 Of 
course, there may still be interesting connections between this type of norma-
tivity and other types of normativity. For example, we are inclined to think that 
one has moral reason to care fittingly about things that matter morally. If you 
care about football more than famines, then your attitudes are not just unfitting: 
they are morally defective. But there remains a distinction between moral per-
missibility and that which governs attitudes of caring. It is this second type of 
normativity that matters for our notion of importance.
7 We admit that there are hard questions about how to demarcate the reasons relevant to 
this kind of normativity. But these questions do not relate to the phenomenon we are con-
cerned with. So we will put them aside for the rest of the paper. For these questions see, 
e.g., D’Arms and Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy”; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 
“The Strike of the Demon”; Bykvist, “No Good Fit.”
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What is it to care about something? For us, “caring” refers to any emotional 
response. Adoration and adulation are types of caring. But so too are abhorrence 
and apprehension: you can care about something by hating it just as much as by 
loving it. Such attitudes have a phenomenological character. There is a certain 
way it feels to care about something. It seems plausible that they also have an 
evaluative character. Perhaps caring about something involves valuing (or dis-
valuing) it. And maybe caring is constitutively connected to actions. Perhaps 
adoring something involves being disposed to promote or preserve it. Perhaps 
despising something involves being disposed to prevent or destroy it. We take 
no stand on this final issue. We are neutral about whether there are such connec-
tions between caring and behavior. The account of importance we give would 
be tenable were there such connections. But it would still be interesting without 
them. The key thing is that, when we talk about caring about something, we are 
talking about whatever is involved in emotionally responding to that thing.
Caring defines importance in terms of how much one can care about some-
thing. So what is it to care some amount about something? Here we have a 
choice. The first option conceives of caring as an absolute quantity. How much 
one cares about something is how intensely and for how long one cares about 
it. The second option conceives of caring as a share. How much one cares about 
something is what share of one’s emotional life one devotes to it. The two come 
apart when people have different emotional capacities. Consider a person who 
is incapable of caring a large quantity about anything. They might nonetheless 
devote their entire emotional life to their family. Then they will not care much 
about their family in the first sense, but will in the second. We are neutral be-
tween these options. We think Proportionalism is tenable on either option.
Caring also does not settle who is doing the relevant caring. Here we have a 
second choice. One option is to relativize importance to each individual. On 
this interpretation, how important something is for Adam is how much it is per-
missible for Adam to care about that thing. We have a multitude of importance 
rankings, one for each person. But one can also (or instead) define a non-rela-
tivized notion of importance. There are a couple of ways to do this. First, one 
might define such a notion out of the relativized notions. This is easiest if we 
assume everyone’s importance ranking is the same. That is, everyone is permit-
ted to care to the same degree about everything. Then one can say that how im-
portant something is (simpliciter) is how much it is permissible for anyone to 
care about that thing. Second, one could invoke the emotional life of some ideal 
observer. So how important something is is how much it is permissible for a fully 
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informed, imaginative, and impartial observer to care about it.8 Again, we think 
Proportionalism is tenable on any of these options. For now, what matters is that 
we cash out our notion of importance in terms of maximum permissible degrees 
of caring. How important something is is the maximum emotional response it is 
fitting or permissible to have toward that thing.
This is not the only notion of importance. We have mentioned the axiological 
notion already. But, more saliently, there is also a notion of importance involving 
minimum permissible degrees of caring. On this notion, how important some-
thing is is the minimum one ought to care about it. We think the maximum-per-
missible notion is more interesting. This is because we doubt there is often a 
minimum degree to which one ought to care about things. We will explain why 
in section 5.3. But, for now, let us just note that very little we say depends on this. 
Almost everything we say could be changed to fit the minimum-permissible no-
tion.9 So, we go forward with the maximum-permissible notion. This paper is 
about the most one is permitted to care about things.
2. Proportionalism
We now express Proportionalism a bit more precisely. Let us first characterize 
a notion of normative mass. To do this we assume that some kinds of intrinsic 
properties invite an emotional response. These are the properties that intrinsi-
cally matter. How much normative mass something has is how much of these 
properties it contains. For example, one might think that joy and suffering were 
all that intrinsically mattered. That is, one might think that these are the only 
kinds of intrinsic properties you can permissibly care about. Then the normative 
mass of something is just how much joy it contains and how much suffering it 
contains. Compare a long marriage to a short fling. The former might contain 
a lot of joy and a lot of suffering. So it might have relatively great normative 
mass. The fling hopefully contains some joy but perhaps also some suffering. Yet 
probably much less of both. So it has relatively little normative mass. Of course, 
joy and suffering are likely not the only things that matter intrinsically. Maybe 
beauty matters. Maybe fearsomeness matters. Maybe it matters that you violated 
someone’s rights. Then these too will contribute to normative mass. But joy and 
suffering are likely contributors to normative mass.
What kind of things have normative mass? Not much swings on this. But 
we will treat facts as the bearers of normative mass. We think of facts as proper-
8 There is a venerable tradition that invokes such observers in ethics. See, e.g., Firth, “Ethical 
Absolutism and the Ideal Observer”; Railton, “Moral Realism”; Smith, The Moral Problem.
9 We note the only substantial change in note 16, below.
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ty instantiations and conjunctions thereof. Your marriage, for example, can be 
thought of as the conjunction of some of the facts involving you and your part-
ner. We will say the normative mass of a fact is how weighty are the properties 
that make it up. A weighty marriage may be one that is constituted by much joy 
and suffering. One important bearer of normative mass is the entire universe. 
We will treat this as the conjunction of all the property instantiations. The nor-
mative mass of the entire universe is how much of what matters there is any-
where. So, if there is a lot of joy and suffering, we have a heavyweight universe. 
If there is not much of either, our universe may be lightweight. The key thing is 
that the normative mass of a fact is how much of the properties that intrinsically 
matter it contains.
We can now state our view. Let I( f ) be how important f is. Let NM( f ) be f ’s 
normative mass. Let NM(U) be the normative mass of the entire universe. Then 
Proportionalism says:
I( f ) = NM( f ) .NM(U) 
In other words, how important f is is determined by f ’s share of the normative 
mass of the whole universe. Remember you can interpret I( f ) either as an ab-
solute quantity of caring or as a share of your emotional life.10 So this says how 
much you can care about something depends on the proportion of the universe’s 
total normative mass it makes up. For example, the fling probably makes up a 
smaller proportion of the universe’s total normative mass than the marriage. So 
you can care about it less. Your headache probably makes up a lesser proportion 
than both of these things. So you can care about it still less. And getting priority 
boarding? You can care hardly at all about that.
This view captures the Drop in the Ocean Intuition. This is because the 
weightier the universe is, the less important is an event of given normative mass. 
So, seeing how much joy and suffering there is in the world should make one’s 
own contribution seem of diminished importance. In particular, seeing that Jo-
anna’s suffering is just a drop in a whole ocean of sorrow makes alleviating it less 
important. This alleviation is still good. But it makes up a smaller share of the 
total joy and suffering in the world. This is the initial motivation for the view. We 
now explore Proportionalism a bit further. In particular, we will bring out some 
10 On the first interpretation, you need some way of mapping numbers to absolute quantities 
of caring. To do this, start by saying that 0 maps to no caring at all. Then pick some n to 
map to some given amount of caring. Perhaps, for instance, 0.001 maps to a mild tinge of 
homesickness. Then, for any k, I( f ) = k just in case the amount of caring you can devote to 
f is k/0.001 times that of the homesickness.
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interesting features of the view by comparing it to two alternative accounts of 
importance.
2.1. Intrinsicism
Let us first see how our view relates to the most natural alternative. This alter-
native says that the importance of a fact just is how much of what intrinsically 
matters inheres in the fact. In other words:
I( f ) = NM( f ).
Call this alternative Intrinsicism. Within a given universe, the importance rank-
ing of our view and that of Intrinsicism perfectly coincide. If any two facts, f and 
g, occur in some universe, then Intrinsicism says f is at least as important as g 
if and only if our view says f is at least as important as g. We think this is a nice 
feature of our view.
But Intrinsicism and Proportionalism are otherwise quite different. Accord-
ing to Intrinsicism, all that matters to how important something is is its intrin-
sic properties. Proportionalism says that how it relates to something else—the 
entire universe—also matters. The most severe consequences of this are modal. 
Intrinsicism implies that intrinsic duplicates keep the same importance across 
possible worlds. Consider a world in which nothing much happens but a head-
ache. Suppose you are permitted to care to some degree about the headache in 
this world. Now consider a world in which a duplicate of the headache happens. 
But suppose many other things that matter also happen. Intrinsicism implies 
that you are permitted to care to exactly the same degree about the headache 
in this other world. But Proportionalism implies the opposite. Proportionalism 
implies that you cannot care as much about the headache in the second world. 
This is because it makes up a lesser proportion of that world’s normative mass. So 
these views differ on the importance of intrinsic duplicates.
This difference might seem detrimental to Proportionalism. Compare the 
lonely headache to a murder in a world full of joys and suffering. The headache 
makes up a large proportional share of the normative mass of its universe. The 
murder does not. So, on Proportionalism, the former is more important than 
the latter. But, one might think, surely a murder must be more important than 
a headache? If so, Proportionalism gets these cases wrong. But we think not. 
Now we do think there is something right about this thought. When a murder 
and a headache happen in the same world, you should care about the murder 
more. But the thought is not just that. It is that, even if a headache were all that 
ever happened, you should care less about it than you should about a murder in 
a well-populated world. To us, this does not seem intuitively obvious. Indeed, 
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there is reason to doubt it. It is in tension with the Drop in the Ocean Intuition. 
The murder is just a drop in the ocean. The headache is the ocean. So if drops are 
less important the less of an ocean they make up, the murder must be less im-
portant than the headache. So, we doubt this difference is detrimental to Propor-
tionalism. But there is more to be said, so we return to Intrinsicism in section 5.
2.2. Averagism
Now let us see how our view relates to another alternative. This alternative says 
that how important a fact is is how much more (or less) normative mass that fact 
has than the average fact. In other words:
I( f ) = |NM(¯ f ) − NM( f )|,
where (¯ f ) is the mean normative mass. Call this alternative Averagism. Both our 
view and Averagism say that the importance of a fact depends on the importance 
of other facts. But Averagism says that such issues can change the relative impor-
tance of two facts. Proportionalism never goes that far. According to Proportion-
alism, such issues only ever change the absolute importance of a fact.
How does this make a difference? Consider the ancient Egyptians.11 Suppose 
facts about the past have normative mass. Now imagine that the ancient Egyp-
tians had a far more flourishing society than we currently believe. Suppose they 
lived glorious lives and there were a lot of them to boot. According to Averagism, 
this would make currently splendid lives less important. They would be closer to 
the average. But it would make currently mediocre lives much more important. 
They would be further below the average. So, on Averagism, facts about ancient 
Egypt can affect which things are more important than which other things. But 
that is not so on Proportionalism. According to Proportionalism, the Egyptians’ 
fate cannot affect the relative importance of things. It can make some things 
of less absolute importance than they would otherwise be. But it cannot affect 
which things are more important than which other things. We think the conse-
quence of Averagism here is implausible. But that of Proportionalism is tenable. 
But again there is more to be said. So we will return to the issue in section 4.
2.3. Empty Worlds
A final interesting way these views relate lies in how they treat empty worlds. 
These are worlds that contain nothing that matters: everything in them has zero 
normative mass. According to both Intrinsicism and Averagism, everything in 
11 Jeff McMahan first discovered that ancient Egyptology mattered for some moral theories—
specifically, average utilitarianism (“Problems of Population Theory,” 115). But Derek Parfit 
made the point prominent (Reasons and Persons, 420).
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an empty world has zero importance. Intrinsicism says this because it says the 
importance of a thing is just its normative mass, which is zero. Averagism says 
this because it says that the importance of a thing is the difference between its 
normative mass and the average normative mass. In an empty world the average 
normative mass is zero and everything has exactly this normative mass. So both 
views attribute everything in an empty world zero importance. But according to 
Proportionalism, the importance of anything in an empty world is undefined. 
That is because the normative mass of an empty world is zero. And you cannot 
divide by zero. So you cannot assess the importance of anything in an empty 
world.
We think this is a feature of Proportionalism, not a bug. To see why, consider 
what must be the case in an empty world. By definition, no facts have any nor-
mative mass in such a world. But now consider facts about the permissibility of 
attitudes. Suppose such facts had normative mass. Then they could not be in an 
empty world. But we think such permissibility facts do have normative mass. We 
think this because it matters whether there is a maximum amount you can care 
about something. This matters even—or especially—if this maximum amount 
is 0. This is because you can care that 0 is the most you can care about some-
thing.12 So no such permissibility facts must obtain in the empty world. But this 
just amounts to the claim that the importance of everything in such a world is 
undefined. So, our view gets the right results in this case.
But this might be denied. Perhaps we are wrong to think that facts about 
what is important themselves have normative mass. Even so, we do not think 
this would be a significant problem. This is because we doubt it is metaphysically 
possible for a universe to be normatively empty. We doubt this because we think 
various modal facts have normative mass. Consider the fact that there could have 
been intelligent life. We think that this fact matters. Indeed, if there is no intelligent 
life this fact is grounds for regret. But plausibly every possible universe must 
contain facts like this. So every possible universe has at least some normative 
mass. So, how Proportionalism treats empty worlds is a feature, not a bug.13
12 Does it matter that you cannot care more than some amount about the fact that you cannot 
care more than some amount about some fact? And so on? We think so. But such facts 
about permissibility plausibly matter less and less the higher up you go, so do not matter in-
finitely much in total. For instance, the normative mass of these permissibility facts may be 
characterized by the sequence 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, . . . , such that their total normative mass is 1 (since 
∑∞n=1(1/2)n = 1). So we do not think that this kind of regress presents a problem.
13 But perhaps this is wrong. Nonetheless, Proportionalism could easily be modified. We 
could treat facts in non-empty worlds as dictated by Proportionalism, but stipulate that the 
importance of everything in an empty world is 0. This is a little inelegant. But a little inele-
gance ain’t fatal.
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3. The Insignificant Speck Intuition
We now turn to providing further motivation for the view. So far, we have just 
claimed it captures a widespread intuition: the Drop in the Ocean Intuition. But 
we think it can also capture another common intuition:
The Insignificant Speck Intuition: Look up at the stars. There are a lot of 
them. In fact, there are 1013 of them in our supercluster alone. That is one 
followed by thirteen zeros. And our supercluster is just one in ten million 
superclusters. That is a lot of stars. The universe is vast and awe-inspiring. 
You, your actions, everyone you know, the whole history of your civiliza-
tion and species is just a tiny speck in this vast universe. This realization 
can make all these things seem less important. The fact that the universe 
is vast beyond comprehension reduces the significance of your own ac-
tions.
Here is how Proportionalism can capture this. Above, we suggested that the nor-
mative mass of a world might be the amount of joy and suffering it contains. But 
this is quite a limited view. We already mentioned that beauty or fearsomeness 
might contribute to the normative mass of the world. And the list need not stop 
there: in particular, we think that awesomeness, in the sense of worthiness of awe, 
may contribute to normative mass. And it is plausible that the sheer size of our 
universe is awesome. So, given our account of importance, the vastness of the 
universe should diminish the importance of our actions. This is the Insignificant 
Speck Intuition.
This is not to say that these are the only considerations at play in the Insignif-
icant Speck Intuition. Like with the Drop in the Ocean Intuition, other things 
may also play a role. Nagel, for instance, claims that the Insignificant Speck Intu-
ition conveys the absurdity of our lives. He takes this to amount to “the collision 
between the seriousness with which we take our own lives and the perpetual 
possibility of regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary.”14 
Perhaps. And if so, our view will not capture this aspect of the intuition. But we 
think this is not all there is to the intuition. We are not merely aware of the arbi-
trariness of our aspirations; we are aware of the insignificance of our concerns 
when measured against the vastness of the universe. Our view can capture this 
aspect of the Insignificant Speck Intuition.
14 Nagel, “The Absurd,” 718.
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4. A Deeper Motivation
The evidence we have just given for our view is intuitive fit. It captures various in-
tuitions we think are widespread. This type of motivation is not to be sneezed at. 
Many good philosophical theories are justified by intuitive fit alone. But we can 
also give Proportionalism a deeper motivation. This motivation is not essential: 
you can accept the view without accepting this motivation. But we ourselves 
think this motivation provides strong support for Proportionalism. It shows that 
the view follows from some assumptions that we find compelling.
Roughly, the deeper motivation goes like this: to have fitting attitudes, your 
attitudes have to be proportional to how much things matter. A person suffering 
in front of you matters much more than the fact that your paper got rejected. 
So it would be unfitting to care more about the paper than the person. But you 
are a finite being with finite conative resources. There is only so much you can 
care about things. So consider what happens when you move through universes 
where more and more things matter. Because of your conative limits you cannot 
keep expanding how much you care about things willy-nilly. So, to keep your at-
titudes in proportion, you need to reduce how much you care about your paper’s 
rejection. So how much you can care about the rejection is proportional to the 
normative mass of the universe. In universes where more matters, you have to 
care about it less. But this, if you squint right, is Proportionalism.
That is a rough statement. Now let us go a bit more carefully. We first define 
what it is to have overall fitting degrees of caring. This means that every collec-
tion of your degrees of caring is permissible. We now state our first assumption. 
This is the assumption that your degrees of caring are overall fitting if and only 
if they are proportional to the normative mass of facts. This assumption is made 
up of a necessary and a sufficient condition. The necessary condition says that 
it is necessary for overall fittingness that your attitudes are in proportion to the 
normative mass of things. So if you care much more about the paper than the 
person, your degrees of caring cannot be fitting. The sufficient condition says 
that this is also sufficient for overall fittingness. So if you care proportionally 
about the paper and the person (and everything else), then your degrees of car-
ing are fitting. We can put this as follows:
Congruity: Necessarily, your overall degrees of caring are fitting if and 
only if, for any facts f and g, if the normative mass of f is n times greater 
than the normative mass of g, you care n times more about f than about g.
We expect Congruity to be controversial. We will discuss objections to it in sec-
tions 5.1–5.4. But we think it has strong prima facie plausibility. And we think 
240 Lovett and Riedener
we can answer the objections. So we think it grounds a credible motivation for 
proportional thinking.
We also rely on a second assumption. This assumption is twofold. First, we 
assume that there is a maximum degree you are able to care about things. The 
idea here is just that you are a finite being with finite emotional resources. If you 
were a god perhaps you could care without bound. But you are not a god: there 
is a limit to the intensity and duration you can care about things. Second, we 
assume that you can have any collection of caring attitudes that together do not 
exceed this limit. In the relevant sense of “can,” the only constraint on your car-
ing attitudes is that you have limited conative resources. To put this another way:
Limits: There is a maximum amount, T, you are able to care about things, 
but any collection of attitudes consistent with this limit is possible.
In what follows, we will stipulate that T = 1. This is required to get the precise 
formulation of our view. But nothing deep swings on this: it is just an arbitrary 
choice about which number represents the limit. This aside, when it comes to 
Limits we think the claim that we are not gods will be uncontroversial. But the 
claim that you could have any attitudes that do not exceed the limit might be 
controversial. We will discuss this in section 5.5.
These are our two primary assumptions. These assumptions alone have a 
very interesting consequence. They entail that for any fact, f, the maximal degree 
you are able to care about f consistent with you having overall fitting attitudes is:
NM( f )
.NM(U)
This just is our formula for I( f ). Thus the maximal degree you can care about 
f while having overall fitting attitudes is the proportion of the universe’s total 
normative mass that f represents. This means that these assumptions alone get 
us very close to Proportionalism.
We will just give an informal proof that this entailment holds.15 Consider any 
fact, f. If the share of your maximal total degree of caring that you devote to f is 
15 Whenever we give an informal proof, we have a formal proof that we do not include. In 
this footnote we will outline the relevant formalization of these assumptions. But we will 
not provide the whole proof. We begin by setting up a framework. Remember we defined 
a fact as a property-instantiation or a conjunction thereof. We will represent a conjunction 
of property-instantiations as a set. So let Ω = { f1, f2 , . . . , fn} be the set of property-instantia-
tions. This means Ω represents the entire universe. Let ℘(Ω) be the set of all subsets of Ω 
(i.e., its power set). So this represents the set of all facts. Let NM be a non-negative function 
of facts representing the normative mass of a fact. Let c be a non-negative function of facts 
representing how much you care about a fact. Finally, let fit represent the fact that you have 
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greater than f’s share of the normative mass of the universe, then you cannot care 
proportionally about every other fact. This is because if you cared proportion-
ally about every other fact, your total degrees of caring would exceed 1. So your 
overall attitudes cannot be fitting. If the share of your maximal total degree of 
caring that you devote to f is precisely equal to f ’s share of the normative mass of 
the universe, then you can care proportionally about every other fact: you will 
do so if the share of your maximal total degree of caring that you devote to any 
other fact g is precisely equal to g’s share of the normative mass of the universe. 
So your overall attitudes can then be fitting. So this formula describes the maxi-
mum degree you can care about f consistent with having overall fitting attitudes.
This is an interesting result. But it does not quite yet give us our account of 
importance. This is because we said how important something is is the most you 
can fittingly care about it. We just showed that caring too much about something 
entails your overall attitudes cannot be fitting. But this does not mean that this 
very attitude is unfitting. Having it might ensure some other attitude (or collec-
tion thereof) is unfitting, but it need not be unfitting itself. So, to get our account, 
we need the following:
Necessary Means: If p necessarily implies that you violate some of your 
obligations, then you ought to see to it that ¬p.
This is a necessary means principle. It says you ought to see to the necessary 
means to not violating your obligations. We think such a principle explains why 
you should not make promises you cannot keep or have children you cannot 
care for. Doing so ensures you will violate an obligation. So we find this principle 
very plausible. Yet it is not beyond dispute. We discuss an objection to it in sec-
tion 5.6. But for now, let us see how this leads to Proportionalism.
Here is an informal proof. Recall that I( f ) denotes the normative mass of 
overall fitting degrees of caring. In this framework, we can formalize our two principles as 
follows:
Congruity ( formal): fit ←→ for all F and G in ℘(Ω) and any real number t such that 
NM(F) = t × NM(G), c(F) = t × c(G).
Limits ( formal): c(Ω) ≤ 1.
Two notes about this formalization. First, we should interpret these principles as neces-
sarily true. Second, Limits (formal) just captures the first conjunct of Limits. The second 
conjunct is captured by the fact that this is the only constraint we assume on c. Assuming 
that NM(Ω) > 0 it can be shown that for any F in ℘(Ω), NM(F)/NM(Ω) is the maximal 
value c(F) can take while Congruity and Limits hold and fit is true. That is, in light of these 
assumptions, F’s share of the universe’s total normative mass represents the maximum you 
can care about F while having overall fitting degrees of caring.
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f over that of the entire universe. Suppose this is the maximum one can care 
about f consistent with having overall fitting degrees of caring. So, if you care 
more than I( f ) about f, you must lack overall fitting degrees of caring. But that 
you lack overall fitting degrees of caring just means that some collection of your 
attitudes is impermissible. So, you violate one of your obligations. So by Neces-
sary Means, you ought not care any more than I( f ) about f. Next, recall that it is 
possible for you to care exactly to degree I( f ) about f while still having overall 
fitting degrees of caring. But this—caring to degree I( f ) about f—is itself a de-
gree of caring. So, if you can have this attitude and have overall fitting degrees 
of caring, this attitude can itself be permissible. So it is possible for your caring 
exactly to degree I( f ) about f to be permissible. So I( f ) is the maximum you can 
permissibly care about f.
This completes the deeper motivation for our view.16 Roughly, Proportional-
ism follows from the need to keep our attitudes in proportion while being con-
strained by our human limitations. With this in hand, we can see better where 
Proportionalism and its competitors come apart.17 If you deny Proportionalism, 
you must reject Limits, Congruity, or Necessary Means. Let us make this vivid 
16 This is where the distinction between the maximum-permissible and the minimum-permis-
sible notions of importance (from section 1) makes a difference. We could have character-
ized importance as a measure of the minimum one ought to care about something. For this 
notion of importance, our exact argument does not go through. This is because the right-left 
of Congruity implies there are no such minimums. But a closely related argument does. The 
related argument endorses the left-right of Congruity and endorses Lower Limits. Lower 
Limits says you must use some positive minimum proportion of your emotional resources. 
You must use, let us say, at least one percent of your emotional resources. Now consider any 
fact, f. Identify the fraction of the universe’s total normative mass f makes up. Suppose you 
devoted less than 1 percent of this fraction of your emotional life to f. Then you could not 
care about all other facts proportionally. For suppose you did. Then you would not end up 
using even 1 percent of your emotional resources. In other words, in order to have propor-
tionate attitudes that exceed the lower limit, the minimum degree you care about anything 
must be proportionate to the share of the universe’s total normative mass that thing makes 
up. Why would one endorse Lower Limits? Well, humans are feeling animals. We may be 
able to numb ourselves: we may be able to care about very little. But caring about nothing 
whatsoever? Perhaps this we just cannot do. Motivated in this way, Lower Limits is akin 
to Limits: it is a principle about human capability. Alternatively, we could construe Lower 
Limits as a normative principle. So construed, it says that it is impermissible to use less 
than a certain proportion of our emotional resources. Why would that be? Well perhaps it 
is wasteful for such richly endowed beings as us to be so unfeeling. And perhaps such waste-
fulness is not permissible. We will not explore these options further. This is because we have 
our doubts about the minimum permissible degrees of caring (see section 5.3). But, if those 
doubts are misplaced, this provides a promising route to a version of Proportionalism for 
permissible minimums.
17 We can now also see why the fate of the ancient Egyptians can change a thing’s absolute 
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for Intrinsicism. Intrinsicism, remember, said that how much you are allowed to 
care about something is fixed by the thing’s intrinsic properties. So consider any 
world that contains some fact, f1, where f1 is weighty enough that you are per-
mitted to devote your entire emotional life to it. Now consider a second world 
in which two duplicates of f1 exist, f2 and f3. Suppose, in this second world, you 
devote your entire emotional life to f2. If Limits holds, this means you can devote 
none of your emotional life to f3. So your attitudes would be out of proportion. 
But, if Congruity holds, this ensures you violate some of your obligations. Yet 
Intrinsicism says you are permitted to devote your entire emotional life to f2. So 
it follows that you can permissibly do something that ensures you violate some 
of your obligations. And this is just to deny Necessary Means. So, Intrinsicism 
must deny either Limits, Congruity, or Necessary Means. In the next section, we 
will see how much mileage there is in such denials.
5. Objections to the Motivation
We now look at ways to reject the claims on which this deeper motivation rests. 
This is not just an exercise in rebutting objections (although it is that). It is an 
exercise in seeing how our view would change if one takes these objections seri-
ously. We think that, even if you take these objections seriously, you are left with 
some version of Proportionalism. We first look at some objections to Congruity. 
Then, we look at an objection to each of Limits and Necessary Means.
5.1. Too Demanding I
Congruity may seem too demanding. It seems to imply that you should drain 
your life of personal concern. You should almost not care at all about your own 
joys and sorrows. You should care very little about the successes of your projects 
or the state of your health, or about the lives of your nearest and dearest. This is 
because (in our universe) a lot of other things matter. If you care proportionally 
about all these other things, you must care minimally about things of personal 
concern. But this may seem implausible. So, Congruity—the left–right of Con-
gruity in particular—must be false.
We think this is an interesting objection to Congruity. But we do not think it 
refutes it. There seems to us two ways to reply to the objection. The first is to dig 
in one’s heels: one could simply maintain that we should all care far less about 
our personal affairs than we normally do. This position has affinities with certain 
importance. If the Egyptians lived glorious lives, then you ought to be happier about them 
than otherwise. This crowds out caring about other things.
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demanding, impersonal moral theories. Consider classical utilitarianism. This 
implies that we should do much less than we usually do to improve our personal 
affairs. We should act much more for others’ benefit. The heel-digging position 
implies that we should care much less than we usually care about our personal 
affairs. We should care much more about other people. Both views go against 
much commonsense thinking. But neither, we think, is totally untenable. We 
might ordinarily do very poorly in both action and attitude. So, we think that if 
you find demanding, impersonal moral theories congenial, then you should find 
this position congenial.
The second response is more concessive. One might simply endorse an 
agent-relative theory of normative mass. Such a theory says that how weighty 
a thing is depends on whose perspective we assess it from. From your perspec-
tive, your wine collection might be a weighty matter. But from mine it is not 
so weighty. This view makes sense if you think that agent-relative properties 
contribute to normative mass. Such properties include those that reference you 
essentially. To assess how much of your joy and your suffering something has 
is to assess its agent-relative properties. Your projects usually involve more of 
your joy and your suffering than do those of anyone else. So, from your per-
spective, they may make up a larger proportion of the universe’s normative mass 
than do those of anyone else. So, caring copiously about your personal affairs is 
compatible with Congruity. You just need an agent-relative theory of normative 
mass. With such a theory, Proportionalism should then be interpreted as itself 
agent-relative. It defines a different importance ranking for each person.
But maybe neither of these responses works. This would provide grounds to 
reject Congruity. But it need not be wholesale rejected. For it seems we can dis-
tinguish between different domains: the impersonal domain and the personal 
domain. We can understand this distinction as one between different kinds of 
facts. For a fact to be in your personal domain might just be for it to essentially 
concern your projects, or your loved ones, or your well-being. But facts in the 
impersonal domain do not essentially concern you at all. One way to think of the 
impersonal domain is as the domain of agent-neutral facts. The personal domain 
is then thought of as a subset of the domain of agent-relative facts. Once we 
make this distinction, we can say that Congruity applies only in the impersonal 
domain. It does not apply in the personal domain. On this view, Proportion-
alism may hold for one class of facts, but it need not hold for them all. We will 
discuss this view further in section 6.1.
5.2. Too Demanding II
Congruity may seem too demanding in a different way. It may allow us too lit-
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tle discretion in what we care about. For example, some of us choose to devote 
much of our emotional energy to economic injustice in England. But this injus-
tice might involve less of what matters than does the malaria infection world-
wide. After all, over two hundred million people suffer from malaria every year. 
Yet perhaps our attitudes are nonetheless fitting. Perhaps we have some choice 
over how much, relatively speaking, we care about worthy things. Yet that is in-
consistent with Congruity. So, Congruity—the left–right of Congruity in partic-
ular—must be false.
One could respond to this by again digging in one’s heels. Some people, such 
as classical utilitarians, think we have little choice over what we may do. Analo-
gously, perhaps we have little choice over what we may care about. But suppose 
we take the objection more seriously. Even so, there is a reply to it. First, note 
that normative masses can be incommensurable. Perhaps there is no definite 
way that economic injustice and malaria weigh up. Rather, the normative mass 
of economic injustice is indeterminate, but determinately between a quarter and 
half of that of malaria. This calls for a minor modification of Congruity. Sup-
pose one cares about economic injustice anywhere between a quarter and half as 
much as one cares about malaria. Then we should say one has fitting attitudes.18 
This already gives us some choice over how much we care about things. But now 
let us exploit the agent-relative conception of normative mass we previously 
mentioned. On this conception it is plausible that the fact that you cared a lot 
about something in the past can make that thing weightier now. It can make it 
matter more for you today. So suppose, in June, you cared half as much about 
economic injustice as you did about malaria. This means economic injustice has 
a little extra normative mass in July.19 So, in July, perhaps you may care anywhere 
18 More formally, we use a set of functions NM = {NM1 , NM2 , . . .} to jointly represent the nor-
mative mass of facts. We then say that your overall degrees of caring are fitting if and only if 
there is some function NMi in NM that you satisfy Congruity with respect to. A version of our 
argument for Proportionalism then goes through.
19 Will malaria also have a little extra normative mass? Perhaps not. It might only get weightier 
when you have cared about it more than you had to, given your other attitudes. It might 
be voluntary devotion alone that adds mass to a thing. But we need not rely on that. The 
described mechanism works as long as you may treat economic injustice as gaining propor-
tionately more mass than malaria. Suppose you may consistently treat malaria as getting 9 
percent weightier but injustice as getting 11 percent weightier. Then, eventually, the norma-
tive mass of the injustice will exceed that of malaria. Why might this be permissible? Well, 
it is plausibly indeterminate how much mass your having cared about something adds to 
its existing mass. But your caring might determinately add between 9 and 11 percent to this 
existing mass. And perhaps you may consistently choose to care in line with the lower end 
of this range for malaria and the higher end for injustice. So you may consistently treat the 
injustice as getting proportionately weightier than malaria.
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between one and two-thirds as much about it as you do about malaria. Suppose 
you choose two-thirds. Then, in August, you may care anywhere between half 
and three-quarters as much about it as you do about malaria. We are off to the 
races. By iterating this process, you can step up how much you may care about 
worthy things. And you can do so without ever having unfitting attitudes. We 
think this gives us ample choice over our relative degrees of caring.
But maybe that is wrong. Maybe we need more choice. Yet it seems implau-
sible that one has complete discretion over what one cares about. Suppose you 
care a lot about economic injustice. That does not mean that, when someone 
dies in front of you, you may remain completely cold. This would be to have 
unfitting attitudes. So we should not reject Congruity wholesale. We should re-
formulate it. We should say that one’s attitudes are fitting when they are not too 
far out of proportion. There are a few ways to capture this. One way is to say that 
there is a factor k > 0 such that, when f is n times the normative mass of g, your 
attitudes are fitting whenever you care between k × n and k/n as much about f as 
about g. So, for example, suppose that malaria has twice as much normative mass 
as economic injustice. If k = 4, then it is permissible to care twice, but at most 
twice, as much about the injustice as about malaria. But there are other ways to 
capture the point. Whichever way we do it will get us a version of Proportion-
alism.20 If your attitudes cannot get too far out of proportion, then in weightier 
worlds you may care less about anything in particular.
5.3. Too Permissive I
Congruity may instead seem too permissive. This is because it allows you to care 
very little about certain things. It says that, if your attitudes are in proportion, 
then they are fitting. But your attitudes can be in proportion without you car-
ing much about anything. So your attitudes can be fitting when you care about 
things very little.21 Yet suppose you are in the midst of a famine. And suppose 
you care very little about everything. Then this means you are allowed to also 
20 The simple suggestion in the text gives us a somewhat complex version of Proportionalism. 
It implies that the importance of f equals
k × NM( f )
(k − 1) × NM( f ) + NM(U) .
21 Indeed, your attitudes are proportionate in the sense of satisfying the right-hand side of 
Congruity when you care about nothing at all. To see this, imagine f and g are the only facts. 
Suppose you care to degree 0 about g. But suppose f is twice as weighty as g, so NM( f ) = 
2 × NM(g). Then you must care to degree 2 × 0 about f. But you do this by caring to degree 0 
about f. So, when you do not care about anything, your attitudes satisfy the right-hand side 
of Congruity.
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care proportionally little about those starving around you. Yet one might object 
that caring so little about such a famine is pathologically cold. You are obligat-
ed to care some minimum amount about someone starving in front of you. So, 
Congruity—the right–left of Congruity in particular—must be false.
We think this is an interesting objection. But here is a reply to it. This objec-
tion, we think, has two sources. First, most of us care a lot about some things. We 
care a lot about our jobs, our partners, our receding hairlines, and so on. So, for 
most of us, when we care little about someone starving, our attitudes are out of 
proportion. So, they are impermissible. But, when this is the source of the objec-
tion, it poses little threat to Congruity. Congruity is consistent with this claim. 
The second source, we think, concerns the link between moral normativity and 
fitting attitudes. We suggested one such link in section 1. We suggested that one 
had moral reason to care fittingly about things that matter morally. But perhaps 
there are other links. In particular, perhaps one does something morally wrong 
when one cares very little about what matters morally. One’s attitudes might not 
be unfitting, in this case, but they might nonetheless be morally suspect. Yet 
when this is the source of the objection, it again poses little threat to Congruity. 
Congruity is a principle about the type of normativity confined to caring, not 
moral normativity. So, we do not think this objection refutes Congruity after all.
But perhaps that is wrong. Perhaps there are some facts about which you 
must care to some minimum degree. Nonetheless, this does not really imperil 
Proportionalism. This is because Proportionalism is a thesis about the maxi-
mum degrees you can care about things. It identifies some amount as the max-
imum you can permissibly care about something. We only used the right–left 
of Congruity to establish that caring about something this much is permissible. 
But the objection does not dispute this. It does not suggest that caring up to this 
maximum amount is impermissible. It says caring below a minimum amount 
is impermissible. So let us just assume that you are allowed to care up to this 
amount. But assume you must still keep your attitudes in proportion. Then Pro-
portionalism follows anyway. So, if we maintain this objection, it is not that we 
must reject Proportionalism. It is just that Proportionalism is not the whole sto-
ry. When saying how much you can care about things, we must tell a story about 
minimums as well as maximums. But Proportionalism may be an essential part 
of the story without being the whole story.22
22 Note 16, above, contains a brief Proportionalist story about these minimums. So, even if this 
objection is maintained, we may not need a non-proportionalist story.
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5.4. Too Permissive II
Congruity may seem too permissive in a different way. If you live in a universe 
where nothing much matters, then Congruity permits you to care a lot about tri-
fles. For instance, suppose you lived in a world with just you and the James Bond 
films. According to Congruity, you are then permitted to care enormously about 
Bond. But one might object that caring so much about Bond is utterly over the 
top. Even in such a world, there is an upper limit to how much you can care 
about 007. On this view, you just are not allowed to care that much about certain 
things. So, Congruity—the right–left of Congruity in particular—must be false.
This objection would imperil Proportionalism. For suppose there are upper 
limits independent of Proportionalism. Then the degree of caring identified 
by Proportionalism might exceed the maximum permissible degree. But we 
are skeptical of the objection. We think its force comes from the fact that, in 
our world, the Bond films are rather trivial. This is because our world is full of 
important things. So, in our world, one should not care too much about Bond. 
Yet suppose you really are in a universe where nothing but Bond matters. Then 
we see no reason why you cannot devote large parts of your emotional life to 
Bond. Why must you twiddle your emotional thumbs? Why must you let part 
of your emotional life go to waste? It seems puritanical to deny us access to the 
full expression of our emotional capacity. So, we doubt there are independent 
constraints on caring of this sort.
But maybe that is wrong. Maybe there are some things you just are not al-
lowed to care that much about. Nonetheless, we think that there must be a large 
class of facts that are free of such constraints. Consider, for example, the Sich-
uan earthquake. This was a tragedy. Over eighty thousand people died. We think 
that, apart from Congruity itself, there are no constraints on how much you can 
care about such a thing. If it were the only thing that ever happened, you would 
not be mistaken in devoting all your emotional resources to it. We also doubt 
that, apart from Congruity, there are any constraints on how much you can care 
about the death of a loved one. And, to boot, we think you can care as much as 
you want about Sunset Boulevard. So the above argument will go through with 
respect to this class of facts. In other words, Proportionalism holds for one class 
of facts, but not them all.
5.5. Not Limiting Enough
We have just discussed some objections to Congruity. We now discuss an ob-
jection to Limits. Limits says that there is a maximum amount you are able to 
care about things, but you are able to have any attitudes consistent with this 
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maximum. This objection says that Limits is too permissive. It says that there 
are some collections of attitudes one cannot have, despite their consistency 
with the limit. Suppose, for instance, that you just cannot bring yourself to care 
about bird-watching. Maybe your co-author likes bird-watching very much. But 
it is just not for you. Swifts and swallows (and even sparrows) leave you cold. 
Bird-watching is something you cannot care much about, and this incapacity 
has nothing to do with you having exhausted your overall emotional resources.
This is another interesting objection. But we do not think it refutes Limits. 
Rather, it shows that Limits invokes a specific type of modality, and a specific 
notion of importance. The type of modality just described seems like psychologi-
cal possibility. It is psychologically possible for you to have some attitudes if it is 
metaphysically possible and consistent with central facts about your psycholo-
gy. But psychological modality is very variable: what is psychologically possible 
for someone depends on their peculiar quirks and foibles. So we doubt that the 
notion of importance explicated in these terms is that interesting. It is too con-
tingent, and so lacks generality. Limits characterizes a different type of modality, 
which we might call Limits-possibility: it is Limits-possible for you to have some 
attitudes if it is metaphysically possible and consistent with Limits.23 We think 
that this gives rise to an interesting notion of importance. This notion is sensitive 
to the fact that we are finite, but insensitive to any of our further idiosyncrasies.
But perhaps this is wrong. Perhaps the only interesting notion of importance 
is the one keyed to psychological possibility. Nonetheless, Congruity and Nec-
essary Means still get us a kind of proportional thinking for this notion. To see 
this, consider the fact f1 that you are least able to care about, in proportion to its 
share of the universe’s total normative mass. Maybe this is a very weighty fact, 
but one you can only bring yourself to care about moderately. Or maybe it is a 
lightweight fact, but one you can hardly bring yourself to care about at all. Con-
gruity and Necessary Means then entail that we must adjust how much you can 
permissibly care about any other fact, fk, by how much you can care about this 
fact. To see how, first identify the fraction of your emotional life you are able de-
vote to f1. Then see what fraction of the universe’s total normative mass f1 makes 
up. Then divide the former by the latter. This new fraction identifies how much 
you can care about f1 in proportion to how much you are permitted to care about 
it. How much of your emotional life you are allowed to devote to any fk is then 
this fraction multiplied by the fraction of the universe’s total normative mass 
23 Limits-Possibility might just be physical possibility. We doubt anyone is physically incapa-
ble of caring about bird-watching. This means we need not think of it as a novel, unfamiliar 
kind of possibility.
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that fk makes up. So, even if this objection carries the day, you are stuck with a 
type of proportional thinking.
5.6. Necessary Means Equivocates
Finally, we will discuss an objection to Necessary Means. Necessary Means says 
that you are not permitted to have attitudes that ensure you violate an obliga-
tion. The objection says that Necessary Means rests on an equivocation. It is 
a plausible principle for moral permissibility and practical permissibility. But 
the notion of permissibility we are using is that which rules attitudes of caring. 
And there might be no reason to think Necessary Means holds for this notion. 
Having some attitude might ensure you violate some obligation, without that 
attitude being impermissible qua attitude. So the argument for Proportionalism 
fails at the final step.
This objection is also interesting. But we doubt it goes through. We think 
that the plausibility of Necessary Means in these other cases is probative. The 
normativity that rules attitudes of caring seems enough like these other types 
of normativity that we expect it to obey similar structural rules. That Necessary 
Means holds in these cases is evidence that it holds for the type of normativity 
that governs attitudes of caring. So, we think Necessary Means does hold for the 
type of normativity with which we are concerned.
But perhaps this is wrong. Then Proportionalism does not follow for the nor-
mativity specific to attitudes of caring. Nonetheless, we can identify a kind of 
normativity for which it does follow. It follows for practical rationality, holding 
fixed certain desires. For suppose we hold fixed our desire to have overall fitting 
attitudes. The argument in section 4 shows that conforming to Proportionalism 
must be a necessary means to having overall fitting attitudes. And practical ratio-
nality does obey a necessary means principle. If you want p, and q is a necessary 
means to p, then you ought (practically speaking) to see to it that q. So it follows 
that you ought, practically speaking, to conform to Proportionalism.24 So Pro-
portionalism follows for the practical ought, holding fixed our desire to have 
fitting attitudes. This version of Proportionalism has a somewhat pragmatic air. 
It identifies what, practically speaking, we need to do if we want fitting attitudes. 
But we think most of us do want fitting attitudes. And we think this desire makes 
sense: having fitting attitudes is part of a life well lived. If you actually only care 
24 This necessary-means principle may be wide-scope (see, e.g., Broome, “Wide or Narrow 
Scope?”). So Proportionalism follows for sure only with Necessary Detachment. Necessary 
Detachment says that if p is fixed and you ought to see to it that (p → q), then you ought to 
see to it that q.
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about Bond, then your life is impaired. So, even if you deny Necessary Means, in 
a practical sense you remain bound by Proportionalism.
6. Extending Proportional Thinking
That completes our account of importance. We know of no fatal objections to 
this account, it fits some intuitive data, and it has a nice motivation. So we think 
the account is not obviously false. It may even be true. We also just identified 
several fallback positions that count as kinds of Proportionalism. So, if it is not 
true in letter, it might still be true in spirit. In the rest of the paper, we will explore 
ways to extend these views. We first look at how one might extend the fallback 
position identified in section 5.1. We then look at extensions one could make to 
any of these views, including full-blooded Proportionalism. We think one can 
take or leave these extensions. But this exploration helps show the implications 
(and fruitfulness!) of proportional thinking.
6.1. Domain-Specific Proportional Thinking
In section 5.1, we suggested that Proportionalism might only apply in the im-
personal domain. But we did not say how you should deal out your degrees of 
caring in other domains. Nor did we say how you should deal out your degrees 
of caring between domains. We think proportional thinking can be extended to 
both issues. In this section, we will show how this might be done. This means, 
we think, that such thinking is a much wider phenomenon than that captured 
by Proportionalism alone. You can adopt it even if you restrict or reject this view.
Let us begin with the personal domain. We previously suggested that each 
person’s personal domain is made up of the facts that referenced them essentially. 
But we did not say how much you are allowed to care about each fact. So, con-
sider something in your personal domain. Consider, for instance, that fiery love 
affair you had in college. What is the most you can permissibly care about this? 
That may depend on what the rest of your life looks like. If the rest of your life is 
full of only Muzak and potatoes, then this affair is very important indeed. You 
can devote a lot of your emotional life to it. But if you have lived a more full life, 
perhaps a life full of such affairs, then the college dalliance is less important. You 
can devote less of your emotional life to it. So, the importance of any particular 
fact in your personal domain diminishes as your personal domain gets weightier. 
The more full your life, the less personally important is any individual event in 
your life.
Here is how to spell this out. Let Ip( f ) be how much concern you can permis-
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sibly devote to some fact, f, in your personal domain. Let NM(P) be the norma-
tive mass of the entirety of your personal domain. Then this view says:
Ip( f ) =
 NM( f )
.NM(P)
This view is formally similar to Proportionalism. In both cases, the importance 
of a fact is its normative mass adjusted for how much normative mass there is in 
some wider thing. With Proportionalism the wider thing is the universe. With 
this view the wider thing is the entirety of your personal domain. So this is an 
extension of proportional thinking to the personal domain.
Let us now see how proportional thinking can also extend to the domain of 
rights. This domain is made up of essentially rights-involving facts. So imagine 
you punch someone. If this is the only rights violation that ever happened, then 
it looks quite important. Feelings of penitence may swell your breast. But you 
might instead live in a more callous world. You might live in a world in which 
rights violations are commonplace. Then perhaps this violation is less import-
ant. It would be self-indulgent to wail and moan over this rights violation, when 
rights are being violated all around. We can represent this as before. Let Ir( f ) be 
how much concern you can permissibly devote to some fact, f, in the domain of 
rights. Let NM(R) be the normative mass of the entirety of the domain of rights. 
Then this view says:
Ir( f ) =
 NM( f )
.NM(R)
This gives us two examples of domains—apart from the impersonal—in which 
proportional thinking may apply. We see these examples as proofs of concept. 
We are unsure how exactly one should demarcate the domains if engaging in do-
main-specific proportional thinking. Perhaps the domain of virtue should have 
its place alongside these other domains. Perhaps we should include the domain 
of departmental politics. We do not know. The important point is just that, even 
if Proportionalism itself is too general, proportional thinking may not be.
So, how should you dole out your degrees of caring between domains? We 
will note two views on this. We start with a non-proportionalist view. On this 
view, you can devote a fixed proportion of your emotional life to each domain. 
The simplest way to implement this is to say you can devote the same amount to 
each domain, and together these sum to the entirety of your emotional life. So, 
you can devote a third of your emotional life to the impersonal domain, a third 
to the personal domain, and a third to the domain of rights. On this view, how 
much you can care about the things in some domain never changes. And, on 
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this particular implementation, you cannot trade-off between domains. You can 
never devote more than a third of your emotional life to the impersonal domain, 
even if you do not care at all about the other domains.
But we prefer a second, more proportionalist view. On this second view, how 
much you can care about each domain can change. It is proportional to—but 
not the same as—the fraction of the universe’s total normative mass that a do-
main makes up. For instance, suppose that the normative mass of the personal 
domain is a quarter that of the entire universe. You might nonetheless be al-
lowed to devote half your emotional life to it. But suppose it is an eighth of the 
mass of the entire universe. Then you might be allowed to devote a quarter of 
your emotional life to it. In other words, there is some factor, j, such that the 
proportion of your emotional life you can devote to things in your personal do-
main is j × NM(P)/NM(U). If this factor is large enough, you can care a lot about 
your personal affairs. But the weightier the universe, the less you can care about 
such matters. We think this view captures much of the virtue of Proportionalism, 
without its possibly overbearing character. So, we think it is the best way to im-
plement domain-specific proportional thinking.25
6.2. Reasons
We have so far focused on the permissibility of attitudes. In this section, we look 
at how to extend proportional thinking to the strength of certain reasons. The 
simplest way to do this is to assume that there are links between fitting attitudes 
and reasons. In particular, it seems that we can think of certain emotions—hope, 
pleasure, anticipation—as positive. We can think of others—terror, displeasure, 
trepidation—as negative. Some of these positive emotions may connect to rea-
sons to bring about something. Some of the negative emotions may connect to 
reasons to prevent that thing. We will call these reasons consequentialist reasons. 
So this claim comes down to:
Bridge: How much consequentialist reason one could have to bring about 
f is proportional to how much of these positive emotions one can (per-
missibly) direct toward f. How much consequentialist reason one could 
have to prevent f is proportional to how much of these negative emotions 
one can (permissibly) direct toward f.
Suppose a principle like this is true. Then a simple extension of Proportional-
25 Every such view is extensionally equivalent to one of the agent-relative versions of Propor-
tionalism mentioned in section 5.1. But they differ in their conceptions of normative mass. 
Domain-specific views have no need of an agent-relative conception of normative mass. But 
this is essential to agent-relative versions of Proportionalism.
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ism will extend proportional thinking to reasons. This extension holds that how 
much of these positive or negative emotions one can feel about any fact is pro-
portional to the normative mass of the entire universe. So, how much conse-
quentialist reason one has to bring about (or prevent) some fact is proportional 
to that fact’s share of the universe’s entire normative mass. The weightier the 
universe, the less weighty are consequentialist reasons.
In the rest of this section, we will look at two issues this extension generates. 
The first issue is straightforward. Even if the strength of consequentialist reasons 
varies with the weight of the entire universe, the strength of other kinds of rea-
sons may not. Call a reason that does not vary in this way a local reason. It follows 
that, the weightier the world, the stronger are local reasons relative to nonlocal 
reasons. Here is a concrete example. Suppose that reasons not to violate rights 
are such local reasons. The strength of one’s reason not to punch people is not 
diminished by how much joy and sorrow is in Alpha Centauri. This implies that, 
in weightier worlds, reasons not to violate rights become relatively strong. This 
is because, in weightier worlds, the strength of consequentialist reasons is dimin-
ished. This is an interesting implication. It suggests that the weightier the world 
is, the fewer are the circumstances in which a rights violation is permissible. 
In lightweight worlds, consequentialist considerations win out. But, in heavy-
weight worlds, rights rule the day.
The second issue will take longer to lay out. This is a choice point. If we ex-
tend Proportionalism to reasons, we face the following question: What should 
we do under conditions of uncertainty? The standard view is that one should 
do whatever has the highest expected value. An action’s expected value is the 
value it would realize in each state of the world, weighted by how likely that state 
is. The Proportionalist can adopt this view. They can say that, when we do not 
know what the effects of our actions are, we should do the thing with the highest 
expected value. The Proportionalist flavor comes in when assessing the impor-
tance of such prospects. Their importance, one can say, is their expected value 
divided by the normative mass of the whole universe. It is not their expected 
value alone.
But there is a second, more radical option. This involves a different view of 
how one should act under conditions of uncertainty. This different view says that 
one should do what one has the highest expected strength of reason to do. The 
expected strength of a reason is how strong that reason would be in each state of 
the world, weighted by how likely that state is. To put this formally, let Ri(A) be 
the strength of reason one has to perform A in the ith state of the world. Then the 
expected strength of one’s reason to A is:
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ESR(A) = ∑
i
 Ri(A) × Pr(Si).
This view seems defensible to us. Indeed, expected value maximization may 
seem right only because, in many cases, it matches expected strength of reason 
maximization. So, suppose you think that we should do what maximizes expect-
ed strength of reason. We then get a radical consequence. There will be cases 
where you should not maximize expected value. For suppose Proportionalism 
is extended to reasons. Then maximizing expected strength of reasons will often 
mean maximizing expected proportional improvements. But expected propor-
tional improvement and expected value do not coincide. They diverge in cases 
where you can have big proportional changes that are, in absolute terms, rela-
tively small. So, in such cases, you should not maximize expected value. What 
do such cases look like? Here is an example:
Super-technology: Suppose you can develop the super-technology. If hu-
manity is alone in the universe, then this will make the universe much 
better. It will allow us to bring life to worlds otherwise empty of value. But 
suppose the universe is teeming with intelligent life. Then the universe is 
already overflowing with value. This might seem like reason to rejoice. 
But, alas, man cannot control his warlike nature. We would inevitably use 
the super-technology to bring terror to other worlds. This will make the 
universe much worse. Should you develop the super-technology?
Let us formalize the case. For simplicity, suppose the world where we are alone 
has a normative mass of 4. Suppose the one where we have company has a nor-
mative mass of 40. These assumptions track the fact that more of what matters 
has happened in the latter than the former. Now let n → k represent a move from 
a world of value n to one of value k. Then we can write this decision problem as:
States of the World NM(U) = 4 NM(U) = 40
Probabilities 0.5 0.5
Develop 1 → 2 10 → 8
Do Not Develop 1 → 1 10 → 10
So formalized, it is clear that the expected value of not developing the super-tech-
nology exceeds that of developing it. But the expected strength of reasons to de-
velop it exceeds that of not developing it. The relevant calculations are: 
ESR(Develop) = (0.5 × ¼) + (0.5 × -2/40) = 0.1,
ESR(Do Not Develop) = (0.5 × 0/4) + (0.5 × 0/40) = 0.
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So, if you should maximize expected strength of reasons, you should develop 
the super-technology. So, you should not do what maximizes expected value. 
This is why we call this a radical option. It materially diverges from the standard 
view. We are unsure whether the radical or conservative option is better. But we 
think this is an important choice point generated by applying Proportionalism 
to reasons. More generally, we think extending Proportionalism to reasons raises 
interesting, and sui generis, issues.
6.3. Subjective Proportionalism
Let us look at one final extension of Proportionalism. This also has to do with ex-
pectations. Namely, people often distinguish between objective and subjective 
reasons.26 Suppose you have a glass of clear liquid in front of you. You are thirsty. 
You think the clear liquid is water. So you have good subjective reason to drink 
from the glass. But, actually, what is in the glass is poison. So you have got an ob-
jective reason not to drink it. Roughly, the distinction is this: objective reasons 
depend on just the facts. But subjective reasons depend on what you think the 
facts are, or perhaps what you ought to think the facts are.
This distinction can also be made among fitting attitudes. Proportionalism 
has an objective character. How much normative mass you think the universe 
has does not matter. All that matters is how much normative mass it does have. 
But there seems to be room for a subjective notion of importance. This would 
let what you think, or perhaps should think, about normative masses determine 
how much you can permissibly care about something.
It is straightforward to characterize such a notion. We first help ourselves to 
the notion of expected normative mass. Something’s expected normative mass 
is the probability-weighted average of the normative masses it might have. For 
a fact, f, we denote this ENM( f ). We then say that the subjective importance of a 
fact just is its expected normative mass divided by the expected normative mass 
of the entire universe. In other words:
Is( f ) =
 ENM( f )
.ENM(U)
We can read the relevant probabilities either as actual credences or as evidential 
probabilities. On the first reading, this gives you a notion of importance depen-
dent on what you actually think. On the second, it gives you a notion of impor-
tance dependent on what you ought (epistemically speaking) to think. Subjec-
tive importance and subjective reasons seem interesting on the same grounds. 
26 There is a vast literature on this distinction. For an extensive discussion, see, e.g., Zimmer-
mann, Living with Uncertainty.
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They both satisfy intuitions that our beliefs (or our evidence) should matter 
to our obligations. And they are perhaps, in a sense, more action-guiding. We 
could be deeply uncertain what the universe’s total normative mass is, but we 
might still be able to work up an expectation. So we can still establish how much, 
subjectively speaking, we can permissibly care about something. This notion of 
subjective importance may be a worthwhile extension to Proportionalism. It is 
the last extension to Proportionalism we will look at.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a theory of importance. This theory says that how import-
ant something is is determined by the proportional contribution it makes to the 
total normative mass of the whole universe. We think this fits some intuitive 
data, has a nice motivation, and can be extended in various interesting ways. But 
enough of that. Suppose Proportionalism is true. How should you feel about 
this? Well, it depends. If you are rejoicing at the splendor of your life, proud of 
your achievements, and excited about your projects, then our view will come as 
a setback. You must keep it in perspective: in all likelihood, the good in your life 
is less important than you think. You need to tone down your jubilance. On the 
other hand, if you are overwhelmed by woe, shattered by loss, trembling with 
concern, then our view may come as a comfort. You may keep it in perspective: 
in all likelihood, the evil in your life is less important than you think. You need 
not be so devastated. You may, we think, cease taking yourself so seriously.27
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